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COMMENT
DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR DENIAL OF
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
ABSTRACT: This comment examines two actions for monetary
recovery by educationally injured students. A central thesis is that
one of the key concepts in the analysis of such actions is the "right
to an education," which can be interpreted in two different ways.
It can mean the right to attain a certain educational result, e.g.,
learning to read at grade level, or it can mean the right to have an
equal educational opportunity. The significance of this distinction
is examined with respect to: (1) actions for professional negligence,
i.e., "educational malpractice," and (2) actions under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983.
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Imagine a student who attends elementary and secondary schools for
twelve years. He is regularly promoted, despite some failing marks and a
serious reading deficiency, until finally he is graduated from high school.
Subsequently he is rejected for several full time jobs because he is unable
to read well enough to fill out a job application form. Tests show he has
at best a fifth grade reading ability.' Has this student suffered a compen-
sable wrong at the hands of his teachers or school officials?
To date only two cases have been decided at the appellate level on
1. The facts are substantially those of Peter W. v. San Francisco School Dist.,
60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976), and Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Donohue 11, aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Donohue II].
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these facts-Peter W. v. San Francisco School District2 and Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School District, I & 11.3 In each case the student/
plaintiff sued on a negligence theory claiming as his injury the inability
to read or write. The appellate decisions in both cases affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the actions.
In light of the above decisions, where do pupil/plaintiffs who cannot
read and write stand today? If they sue on a negligence theory and plead
as injury their failure to learn to read, they stand to lose. As will be
seen, simply recharacterizing the injury might change this result, at least
in jurisdictions where sovereign immunity is no problem. In states such
as Missouri, sovereign immunity is a problem;4 consequently, in these
jurisdictions an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be more promising.
The question of a viable legal theory of recovery for educationally
injured pupils may become more insistent in the future. Results of Scho-
lastic Aptitude Tests given to high school seniors have declined steadily
for the last twenty years5 and an estimated thirteen percent of all high
school graduates are functional illiterates-unable to read and write well
enough to get along in modern society.6 Despite declining college board
scores, the high school grades of entering college freshmen are higher
than ever before.? Such data suggest an erosion of academic standards in
secondary schools.
Also indicative of the problem is a substantial decrease over the
last fifty years in the number of nonpromotions in elementary schools.s
During this period the majority of the American educational community
adopted the view that holding a child back and requiring him to repeat
the same material resulted in boredom and did nothing to enhance the
child's educational development.0 A policy of automatic or "social" pro-
motions became solidly entrenched in American schools.' 0 A more prag-
2. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
3. Donohue 1, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), aff'd, Donohue 11,
47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (1979).
4. RSMo § 537.600 (1978).
5. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 24, 1979, at 13.
6. U.S. NEws & WORID REP., Sept. 10, 1979, at 32. In Missouri 10% of the
67,538 eighth graders taking the Basic Essential Skills Test (BEST) in March 1979
failed the Reading/Language Arts component of the test. See Summary: 1978-79
School Year BEST Results for Eighth Grade Students, Missouri Dept. of Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education (July 20, 1979). The BEST is designed to
measure "minimum adult competencies," essentially functional literacy. A sample
question is: "You see this sign: 'Authorized Personnel Only.' This means that
(A) children can play in the area, (B) anyone can rest in the area, (C) only
special workers belong in the area, or (D) this is a place for writers only."
7. COOPERATIVE INsTrruTIONAL RESEARCH PROGRzAM, THE AMERIcAN FRESH-
MAN: NATIONAL NORMS FOR FALL 1978, cited in Walsh, Does High School Grade
Inflation Mask a More Alarming Trend?, 203 SCENCE 982, 982 (1979).
8. Safer, Heaton 8. Allen, Socioeconomic Factors Influencing the Rate of
Non-Promotion in Elementary Schools, 54 PEABODY J. EDUC. 275, 275 (July 1977).
9. Cunningham & Owens, Social Promotion: Problem or Solution?, 60
NAASP BULL. 25, 27 (Oct. 1976).
10. Id. at 27.
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matic explanation for the prevalence of this policy may be found in the
increased strain on school facilities due to the combined effects of popula-
tion growth and compulsory school attendance laws. Financial exigencies
favor promoting school children up and out as rapidly as possible.-"
Whatever the reason for its adoption, the practice of social promo-
tions is the engine that turns out functionally illiterate high school gradu-
ates like Peter W. and Donohue. These students may plausibly claim
to have been injured by the educational system, and where an injury
is claimed the quest for a legal remedy is likely to continue.
II. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AS A THEORY Or RECOVERY
The Peter W. and Donohue cases centered around claims of profes-
sional negligence or "educational malpractice." The essential allegations
in each case were: (1) the defendant school teachers and administrators
had a duty to the plaintiff either to exercise reasonable care or to exercise
the professional skill of an ordinarily prudent educator; (2) the defend-
ants had a duty under the state constitution or statutes to educate the
plaintiff;12 (3) the defendants breached these duties in that they failed
to evaluate the plaintiff's performance adequately, failed to provide proper
instruction, promoted the plaintiff although he had not mastered the
basic skills necessary to benefit from subsequent courses, and ultimately
graduated the plaintiff from high school, although he lacked rudimen-
tary skills of reading and writing;'8 and (4) as a proximate result of these
negligent acts the plaintiff was injured in that upon graduation from
high school he lacked basic skills to the detriment of his employability
and earning capacity.14
The appellate courts in both cases affirmed the trial courts' dismissal
of the complaints. In Peter W. the California Court of Appeals refused
to find a duty of care in teaching students to read and write, stating that
no new area of tort liability should be opened unless "the wrongs and
injuries involved were both comprehensible and assessable within the
existing judicial framework."' 15 The court found that the science of
pedagogy is too uncertain to permit the formulation of workable
11. In Missouri, social promotion is regarded as a fact of life originating
initially in the 1919 requirement (RSMo § 11323 (1919) (current version at RSMo
§ 167.081 (1978)) that school attendance be compulsory through age 14. Con-
versation with Charles G. Foster, Director of Pupil Personnel Services, Dept. of
Elementary and Secondary Education (July 30, 1979).
12. Donohue 11, 47 N.Y.2d at -, 391 N.E.2d at 1858; Peter W., 60 Cal.
App. 3d at 818, 826, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856, 862.
13. Donohue 11, 47 N.Y.2d at -, 391 N.E.2d at 1353; Peter TV., 60 Cal.
App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
14. Donohue II, 47 N.Y.2d at -, 391 N.E.2d at 1853; Peter IV., 60 Cal.
App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
15. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860. Although not so
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standards for assessing alleged academic wrongs. Doubt was also expressed as
to whether an inability to read and write is an "injury" within the law
of negligence; i.e., was plaintiff's mastery of verbal skills a legally pro-
tected interest?16 The court further noted the absence of any "perceptible"
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury alleged
by the plaintiff; after all, there could be many reasons for the plaintiff's
inability to read.17 Finally, the court stressed the burdens of time and
money that might be placed on the educational system if an actionable
duty of care were recognized in this situation.1 8
Regarding the allegation that a statutory duty was breached, the
California court's characterization of the injury as "failure of educational
achievement," an "injury" not "within the meaning of tort law,"' 9 was
again critical, for if there was no cognizable injury no action would lie.
Furthermore, the California education statutes were held to be directed
to the provision of educational benefits, not to the protection against
injury of any kind.2 0
In Donohue I, the New York Supreme Court quoted extensively from
Peter W. and reached the same result for similar reasons. The dissent con-
tended, however, that courts are no less competent to try educational mal-
practice cases than they are to try medical malpractice cases, and further-
more, that if a flood of litigation were feared, the state would not have
abolished sovereign immunity years ago. 21
In Donohue II the New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed
Donohue I, but on different reasoning. The court in Donohue II held
that "a complaint alleging 'educational malpractice' might on the plead-
ings state a cause of action within traditional notions of tort law.."22 Cit-
ing a leading law review article published after Donohue I was decided,23
the court accepted the notion of "a legal duty of care flowing from edu-
cators, if viewed as professionals, to their students." 24 The court also con-
ceded that a judicially manageable standard of care might be evolved,
that proximate cause might be established, and that there might be a
16. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824-26, 131 Cal. Rptr at 860-62. The plaintiffs' char-
acterization of their injury in results-oriented terms, i.e., in terms of their disability
to read or write, was probably fatal in both Peter W. and Donohue. A central
proposition of this comment is that characterization of a plaintiff's injury in
terms of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity may be more success-
ful. For example, does a student with a second grade reading ability who has
been socially promoted to the eighth grade have an equal or fair opportunity. to
benefit from eighth grade course materials?
17. Id.
18. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr at 861.
19. Id. at 826, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
20. Id.
21. Donohue I, 64 A.D.2d at 41-42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
22. Donohue II, 47 N.Y.2d at -, 391 N.E.2d at 1354.
23. Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by
incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. L. REv. 641 (1978).
24. Donbhue II, 47 N.Y.2d at _, 391 N.E.2d at 1353.
[Vol. 45
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judicially cognizable injury in such a case.25 Nonetheless, the court held
that as a matter of public policy such claims should not be entertained by
the courts because of the administrative law doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion.26 The court found that the New York Constitution and statutes
vested control and management of educational affairs in the Board of
Regents and the Commissioner of Education and that judicial recognition
of the plaintiff's cause of action would constitute "blatant interference"
with responsibilities lawfully committed to these administrative agencies. 27
On the question of a breach of statutory duty, the court cited Moch
Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 28 in holding that the education laws were
not intended to impose a duty on a school district "to ensure that each
pupil receives a minimum level of education, the breach of which duty
would entitle a pupil to compensatory damages." 29 According to the court,
any power of review over educational operations was given by the consti-
tution to the legislature and not to the courts acting at the behest of
pupil/plaintiffs.
Donohue 11 is the most recent decision on educational malpractice.
The holding that such a cause of action may exist is binding only in New
York; however, the court was obviously influenced by John Elson's pains-
taking 130 page treatment of the topic in A Common Law Remedy for
the Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching.3 °
There is no reason to believe the influence of this work will be limited to
New York, and it is unnecessary to rehearse here the arguments concerning
the nature of the duty of care, if any, owed to students and whether or
not a submissible case may be made on the question of proximate cause.
These matters, according to Donohue II, can be taken as tentatively set-
tled in favor of the plaintiffs. The issue as to the nature of the injury,
however, requires comment.
In Donohue II the court refused to intervene in academic functions
on the ground that primary jurisdiction over the academic operations of
schools is properly committed to administrative agencies. A student's claim
of injury based on his failure to learn to read or write calls directly into
question the competency of educational personnel in their area of ex-
pertise, teaching. A claim of this kind of injury naturally evokes the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction; when the issue is the competency of experts
the agency in charge of such experts should handle the matter first.
25.- Id. at -, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54.
26. See generally Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426 (1907); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATr LAw §§ 165-171 (1976). The public policy
rationale was recently cited in upholding the dismissal of an educational malprac-
tice suit against a private school in New York. Pietro v. St. Joseph's School, 48
U.S.L.W. 2229 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1979).
27.' Donohue II, 47 N.Y.2d at _, 391 N.E.2d at 1354.
28. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
29. Donohue II, 47 N.Y.2d at _, 391 N.E.2d at 1353.
30. Elson, supra note 23.
1980]
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What, though, if the injury asserted is not the failure to learn, but is
the deprivation of an opportunity to learn? This claim raises not only
a question of educational expertise but also a question of a constitutional
right, thereby undercutting the applicability of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Board of
Education:3 1
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an edu-
cation. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.
32
With respect to this constitutional right, the argument goes back to
the ubiquitous practice of social promotion. When a student is promoted to
a class level substantially above his competency, he is, in effect, deprived
of an opportunity to benefit from the course material in the upper level
classes. This is what must have happened at some point to students Peter
W. and Donohue. A student in eighth grade classes, who, for example,
has only a second grade reading level is obviously at a serious disadvan-
tage-a disadvantage caused by his wrongful placement in the eighth grade
classes. In Brown, of course, the Court was talking about racial minorities
being disadvantaged by their wrongful placement in segregated schools;
however, there is no reason why the principle should not apply to other
groups of students who are wrongfully placed in a disadvantageous edu-
cational setting.
Support for this argument comes from the same court that decided
Donohue I. In Hoffman v. Board of Education,33 the court held that plain-
tiff was entitled to $500,000 in damages because he had been wrongly
placed in a class for children with retarded mental development. Shortly
after entering kindergarten, plaintiff's IQ was tested by the school board's
psychologist and determined to be 74, one point below the cutoff level
for regular classes. The psychologist, however, expressed some uncertainty
as to the test's accuracy and recommended that the child's intelligence be
re-evaluated within two years. The re-evaluation did not take place until
eleven years later when the plaintiff was seventeen years old. At this
time plaintiff's IQ was rated at 94 by one test and 100 by another. There
was compelling evidence that plaintiff's IQ had never been as low as 74.3 4
Expert testimony established that plaintiff had suffered diminished in-
tellectual development and psychological depression as a result of his
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. Id. at 493 (emphasis added). In a companion case the Court reached the
same conclusion on the basis of the fifth amendment due process clause. Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
33. 64 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
34. Id. at 382 n.8, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 108 n.8.
[Vol. 45
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lengthy misplacement in classes for the mentally retarded.3 5 The rule
seems clear that a diminished capacity to learn resulting from wrongful
placement in a disadvantageous educational setting is a compensable in-
jury. The injury is not so much the absence of any specific substantive
learning, but rather the diminution of one's opportunity to learn.3 6
It should be noted that the majority in Hoffman sought to distinguish
Donohue I on the ground that Hoffman involved misfeasance by school
officials in placing plaintiff in the wrong class and then failing to follow
their psychologist's recommendation of re-evaluation. Donohue, on the
other hand, involved an allegation of nonfeasance in failing to teach the
plaintiff to read.y7 Justice Damiani, the author of the court's opinion in
Donohue I, dissented in Hoffman and in so doing made short work of
the majority's attempt to distinguish Donohue. In the first place, the
conduct complained of in Hoffman-failure to re-test plaintiff within two
years-was an act of omission, i.e., nonfeasance; whereas, the conduct com-
plained of in Donohue-failure to teach properly-was an act of misfea-
sance.38 But, the dissent continued, even if the majority had gotten the
labels straight, it would make no difference. "Negligence exists when in-
jury results from the violation of a legal duty . . . , whether the act in
violation be active or passive, of commission or omission, of misfeasance
or nonfeasance." 39 According to Justice Damiani the Hoffman court should
have followed Donohue I and found for the defendant school board on
the ground that no legal duty of care runs from school officials to school
children with respect to the performance of academic functions.40 Although
Justice Damiani was probably correct in believing that Hoffman implicitly
rejected this holding of Donohue I, the matter is now settled in New
York with the acceptance in Donohue 1I of a duty of care flowing from
professional educators to their students.
Returning to Donohue II, the question remains: How solid is the
primary jurisdiction argument on which that decision rested? In Donohue
11 the injury alleged was plaintiff's reading disability and the conduct com-
plained of was negligent evaluation, teaching, and promotion of the plain-
tiff. In this posture the case called into question an array of pedagogical
35. Id. at 879, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 106. This description of the damage is
reminiscent of the Supreme Court's finding in Brown that racial segregation of
school children "generates a feeling of inferiority ... that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone .... A sense of inferiority affects
the motivation to learn." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
36. The most important shortcoming in Elson's analysis of the educational
malpractice cause of action is his characterization of the injury in terms of
"failure to learn." He speaks also of "affective or emotional" harm, but his
analysis stops short of characterizing the injury as a deprivation of an opportunity
to learn. Elson, supra note 23, at 755.
87. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 A.D.2d 869, 886, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 110
(1978).
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practices without alleging any established legal interest infringed by
such practices. Absent a clear legal interest on which to focus the analysis,
the court felt a general review of the defendant's pedagogical practices
would intrude too deeply into areas over which educational agencies had
primary responsibility. If, however, plaintiff had pleaded as his injury
a deprivation of his opportunity to learn, a constitutional deprivation, re-
sulting from a specific negligent educational practice (social promotion),
the primary jurisdiction defense might have been less persuasive.
It appears then that a cause of action for educational malpractice
might be viable, at least in a jurisdiction such as New York that has
abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In Missouri, however,
sovereign immunity remains basically intact. Consequently, an education-
ally injured student in Missouri would require a different legal theory
to recover from a public school or school district. The most promising
theory would appear to be an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 which would
not be barred by state sovereign immunity.41
III. SEctiON 1983 AS A THEORY OF RECOVERY
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42
The principal considerations with respect to a potential section 1983 action
by an educationally injured student are: (1) the sources and nature of
federal rights allegedly infringed; (2) whether or not the claim presents
questions that are justiciable; (3) whether the eleventh amendment bars
actions against a public school or school district; (4) the nature of the
mental state required for liability and the availability of qualified im-
munities to school officials; and (5) the nature and proof of damages.
A. Sources and Nature of Federal Rights
Federally protected rights can arise directly from the Federal Consti-
tution or statutes, or indirectly from state constitutions or statutes. The
fourteenth amendment prohibits states from depriving any persons of
41. The supremacy clause in U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2, bars applicability of
state sovereign immunity statutes to § 1983 actions.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1976) gives federal district
courts jurisdiction to entertain § 1983 actions. In Missouri, federal jurisdiction has
been held not to be exclusive and § 1983 actions are thus cognizable in state cir-
cuit courts. Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank 2 Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310
(Mo. En Banc 1978), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3210 (U.S. Oct. 1979). State
remedies need not be exhausted before invoking § 1983. McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
[Vol. 45
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"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."43 The United
States Supreme Court has held that the liberty interests protected by this
amendment may derive from state as well as federal law. "We think a
person's liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a
statutory creation of the state." 44 The Court has held also that property
interests protected by the fourteenth amendment may be derived from
state as well as federal statutes.4 5 In fact, constitutionally protectible prop-
erty interests may be derived from contractual relationships and even
from informal policies and practices amounting to an institutional common
law.4 6 Thus, both federal and state sources must be examined in consider-
ing whether an educationally injured student has a federally protected
right upon which to base a section 1983 claim.
1. Federal Constitutional Rights
There is no explicit right to an education in the United States Con-
stitution. If such a right exists, it probably arises from the due process or
equal protection clauses.4 7 At the heart of these clauses are such elusive
concepts as "liberty," "fairness," and "equality." Political philosophers have
often noted an inherent duality in these concepts. For instance, do
equality and freedom exist when everyone has an equal right to pub-
lish a newspaper or only when everyone has a printing press? Is it the
negative absence of restraint or the affirmative capacity to act that makes
for liberty or equality?48 Steeped in a Lockean tradition of limited govern-
ment, members of the United States Supreme Court have tended strongly
toward the negative concepts of freedom and equality. In Bolling v.
Sharpe49 the Court said:
Although the Court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any
great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from
bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of
conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot
be restricted except for a proper governmental objective.5 0
The emphasis upon freedom from restraint is obvious.
Although still dominant in American judicial philosophy, the nega-
tive concept of liberty has recently yielded slightly to a more positive or
43. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1977). See also Schopler, Anno-
tation: Supreme Court's Views as To Concept of "Liberty" Under Due Process
Clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 47 L. Ed. 2d 975, 981 (1976).
45. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
46. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
47. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. See generally Hogan, "Obtaining an
Education" as a Right of the People, 3 NOLPE ScH. L.J. 15 (1973); Note, The
Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. Gin. L. REv. 796 (1975).
48. For treatments of the twin concepts of liberty in social theory, see C.
BAY, THE STRucruaR OF FREEDOM 27-64 (1965); 1. BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
118-72 (1969); G. TINDER, POLITICAL THINKING 81-83 (1970).
49. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
50. Id. at 499-500. A similar definition of "liberty" may be found in Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
1980]
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affirmative concept. According to one scholar the crucial break came in
1937 with the end of the judicial attempt to establish a laissez faire govern-
ment.5 1 In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish52 the Court said: "[T]he liberty
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection
of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and wel-
fare of the people.' 53 Arthur S. Miller wrote that with this case "the nature
of liberty under the Constitution was changed; the Positive State received
its constitutional underpinnings. The Court expressly recognized that
liberty could be infringed by forces other than government and that to
counteract them government intervention may be required."54
The notion of affirmative government action to enhance individual
equality and liberty received another boost in the segregation cases.
"Though purportedly acting negatively in cutting away specific acts of
racial discrimination . . . the operational impact of the decisions since
Brown is to require affirmative action by state officials." 55 Even Chief
Justice Burger has tested the waters by stating in dicta: "No one can
question the State's duty to protect children from ignorance." 56 This
statement suggests a right to education, an implication possibly at odds
with the Court's official position that there is no fundamental constitu-
tional right to education: "Education, of course, is not among the rights
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we
find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." 57
Thus, when the question is cast in terms of whether there is a posi-
tive, constitutional right to have an education, the Court says the answer
is "no." However, when the question is cast in negative terms, i.e., in terms
of whether there is a right not to be deprived of an opportunity to get
an education, the answer is "yes," there is such a right.5 8 It is obvious that
when the facts permit alternative phrasings, it is crucial for a plaintiff
seeking to establish this constitutional right to pose the question in nega-
tive terms; that is, in terms appealing to the traditional tendencies of the
Court and, for that matter, of American political philosophy.59
It may be useful at this point to review some of the cases in which'a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right to an educational op-
portunity has been found. In Meyer v. Nebraska60 the Court held un-
51. Miller, Constitutional Revolution Consolidated: The Rise of the Posi-
tive State, 35 Gro. WAstT. L. REv. 172 (1966).
52. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
53. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
54. Miller, supra note 51, at 176.
55. Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law?, 30 GEo. AVAsH.
L. REV. 399, 414 (1962).
56. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).
57. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
58. "Such an opportunity [to get an education], where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms."
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
59. See generally L. HARTz, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AmERICA 50-66 (1955).
60. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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constitutional a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign
languages to children who had not yet passed the eighth grade. The Court
said the statute unreasonably infringed the liberties of pupils to acquire
useful knowledge, of teachers to teach, and of parents to control the
education of their children.6 1 Thus, the opportunity to learn a foreign
language was protected from an unreasonable restraint.
A series of cases applied the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson62 in the field of education. The cases held that when a state
made a certain type of education, e.g., a legal education, available to
white students, a truly equal educational opportunity must be made
available to Negro students. Failure to do so amounted to a deprivation
of the Negro students' constitutional right to an equal educational op-
portunity.63 This series of cases culminated in Brown where it was held
that racially segregated schools were inherently unequal in terms of
educational opportunities offered. 64 These cases posed the question of
educational deprivation in two forms: total exclusion from the white
schools,65 and admission with subsequent exclusion from effective par-
ticipation in the schooling.66 The latter form of the question is the one
most relevant to students who find themselves in classes substantially
above their competencies in reading and writing.
Both total and partial exclusion cases can be found in areas not in-
volving racial segregation. Cases have held that "exceptional" children,
i.e., "mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped,
hyperactive and other children with behavioral problems," cannot be
denied access to all publicly supported education. 67 Hosier v. Evans6 8
held that children who were not permanent residents of the Virgin Islands
could not be denied admission to the public schools there. The courts in
both Hosier and Mills v. Board of Education recognized that considera-
tions of public expense and increased administrative burdens were not
sufficient to justify exclusion of these children from a public education
when such an education was available to other children.69
61. Id. at 401.
62. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
63. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337(1938).
64. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. Id.; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
66. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
67. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868, 875 (D.D.C. 1972).
Accord, Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
68. 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970).
69. Id. at 320; Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969) (greater expense and administrative
burdens insufficient reasons for depriving welfare recipients of their constitu-
tional right to a hearing before termination of their benefits).
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Hobson v. Hansen,7 0 a case involving exclusion from effective par-
ticipation in educational processes, arose from a District of Columbia prac-
tice of using aptitude tests to place school children in educational tracks.
The court found that the aptitude tests were standardized to white middle
class standards and that this frequently caused Negro and disadvantaged
children to be relegated to the lower tracks with little chance of escape.
The court held this to be a denial of an "equal opportunity to obtain the
white collar education available to the white and more affluent children."7'
The court further stated:
Inevitably children from lower socioeconomic levels will tend to
have had a very limited background conducive to developing com-
municative skills of the kind required for success in the normal
academic curriculum. They will tend above all to be handi-
capped in the use of standard English.... Consequently, unless
these children are given intensive remedial instruction in basic
skills, primarily in reading . . . . they will be condemned to a
substandard education.7 2
The court also held that the right to an equal educational opportunity
is embodied in the due process clause as well as in the equal protection
clause. "[T]he doctrine of equal educational opportunity-the equal pro-
tection clause in its application to public school education-is in its full
sweep a component of due process."1 3
The Hobson opinion is notable in that it invokes both negative and
positive concepts of liberty. There is the negative notion that Negro and
disadvantaged students should be freed from the restraints of an unfair
testing and placement system. There is also the positive notion that if an
education is available at the level of white middle class students, then
other students must affirmatively be given the opportunity (through inten-
sive remedial instruction in basic skills) to participate effectively in that
education.
In Lau v. Nichols74 the question presented was whether approximately
1,800 students in San Francisco whose native language was Chinese had a
right to supplemental instruction in English in the public schools. The
Court held that the students had such a right but reached its decision on
a statutory, not constitutional, ground. Although fourteenth amendment
grounds were argued, the Court found it sufficient to hold that denial of
"a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program" 75
violated section 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which bans discrimination
70. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
71. Id. at 407.
72. Id. at 471. See also Larry P. v. Riles, 48 U.S.L.W. 2298 (U.S. Oct. 16,
1979) (denial of equal protection where utilization of IQ tests standardized to
white middle class children resulted in placement of disproportionate numbers
of black children in classes for the mentally retarded).
73. 269 F. Supp. at 493.
74. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
75. Id. at 568.
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"on the grounds of race, color, or national origin" in federally funded
programs.7 Even though the constitutional issues were not reached, the
Court's reasoning in finding an educational deprivation is important:
[S]tudents who do not understand English are effectively fore-
closed from any meaningful education. Basic English skills are at
the very core of what these public schools teach. Imposition of a
requirement that, before a child can effectively participate in the
educational program, he must already have acquired those basic
skills is to make a mockery of public education."7
justice Blackmun, with Chief Justice Burger joining him, concurred only
because large numbers of students were involved. 78
The facts in Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools 79 were essentially
the same as in Lau except Spanish-surnamed children were involved. The
district court held that the children's English language deficiencies and
a paucity of bilingual instructors constituted a deprivation of the chil-
dren's constitutional right to an equal educational opportunity.8 0 The
Tenth Circuit, however, affirmed on the basis of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, as in Lau, without reaching the constitutional issues. The appellate
court emphasized that "numbers are at the heart of this case and only
when a substantial group is being deprived of a meaningful education will
a Title VI violation exist." 8' Here, too, arguments concerning financial
considerations were not permitted to bar the vindication of students' educa-
tional rights.
The main argument favoring a policy of social promotion is the
financial one, i.e., cost effectiveness. If large numbers of students were
held back, there might not be enough teachers or school rooms to ac-
commodate them. The courts, however, have not been very receptive to
this argument where federally guaranteed rights were involved. In Stanley
v. Illinois,82 Justice White's majority opinion held that a state could not
terminate the parental rights of unwed fathers, for reasons of administra-
tive efficacy, without meeting due process requirements of notice and
hearing. What Justice White said there could well be applied to the
practice of social promotion:
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d) (1976).
77. 414 U.S. at 566.
78. Id. at 572.
79. 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), affd, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
Accord, Arvizu v. Waco Indep. School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. Tex. 1973),
rev'd in part, 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 496 F.2d 1309 (5th
Cir. 1974) (absence of appropriate curriculum for Mexican-American pupils created
an "inherently unequal" situation which placed an affirmative duty on school
officials to provide for the special needs of these pupils). See generally McCarthy
& Thomas, The Right to an Education: New Trends Emerging from Special Edu-
cation Litigation, 7 NOLPE Scn. L.J. 76 (1977).
80. 351 F. Supp. at 1282.
81. 499 F.2d at 1154.
82. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cogni-
zance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution rec-.
ognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.... Procedure by
presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized de-
termination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the de-
terminative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly
disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it need-
lessly risks running roughshod over the important rights of both
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.8 3
In sum, courts have acted consistently to vindicate equal educational
opportunity rights. The right of elementary school children not to be un-
reasonably denied an opportunity to learn a foreign language was upheld
in Meyer v. Nebraska.8 4 The rights of racial minorities,8 5 handicapped
children,8 culturally deprived children,8 7 non-resident students,88 and
linguistic minorities8 9 have all been vindicated in the face of discrimina-
tory school practices. In none of these instances have considerations of
financial cost or administrative efficacy been sufficient to save the dis-
criminatory practice.
The Meyer case is unique in dealing with elementary school children
in general. Other cases have dealt with a deprivation suffered only by
some identifiable sub-group of school children; consequently, these cases
fit more comfortably within the favored notion of negative liberty as op-
posed to positive liberty. The courts are more ready to remove restraints
on the liberty of a few children than they are to require the affirmative
enhancement of the liberty of all. In this context it could easily be argued
that students who are advanced via social promotion constitute a sub-
group whose liberty to learn is inequitably restrained. Their opportunity
to benefit from the courses offered is restrained by their inadequate verbal
skills just as the opportunities of the children in Lau and Serna were re-
strained.
The principal judicial obstacle to finding a constitutional right on
which to base a section 1983 action is San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez,9 0 where the Supreme Court held that "education" is not a
fundamental right protected by the Federal Constitution.91 This holding
arose in the context of a school financing case. Appellees' argument was
that wealthy school districts raised more money from property taxes and
therefore had more money per pupil to spend, resulting in a deni d of
equal protection to students in poorer districts. A preliminary question,
83. Id. at 656-57.
84. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
85. See notes 68-64 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
87. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
88. Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970).
89. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351
F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), afrd, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
90. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
91. Id. at 35.
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however, was whether appellees had asserted a fundamental right which
would trigger the compelling state interest standard of review.92 On this
issue, a majority of five held that education was not a fundamental right.
The Rodriguez decision was based on the following reasoning: (1)
A right is "fundamental" only if it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.9 3 (2) A right to education is not explicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.94 (3) A right to education, meaning by "education" the
acquisition of substantive knowledge or skills, is not implicitly guaranteed
by virtue of any relationship to the rights of speech or vote because the
Constitution does not guarantee rights of "the most effective speech or
the most informed electoral choice." 95 (4) Therefore, the right to educa-
tion, which is neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, is not fundamental, and even if it is fundamental by virtue of a
linkage to the rights of speech and vote, "no charge fairly could be made
that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire
the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech
and full participation in the political process." 96
For present purposes the important point to note about this reason-
ing is that the concept of a "right to education" is used in a positive, sub-
stantive, results-oriented sense in step (3) where it is denied "fundamental"
status, while it is used in a negative, procedural, opportunity-oriented sense
in step (4) where, for purposes of argument, fundamental status is ad-
mitted. The Court's analysis overlooks this important conceptual distinc-
tion. The holding is clear that a right to education in a substantive,
results-oriented sense is not a fundamental constitutional right; however,
the constitutional status of a right to an equal educational opportunity
is still an open question.
In sum, there is a constitutional right to an equal educational oppor-
tunity. Such a right was arguably recognized first in 1923 in Meyer v.
Nebraska; it was more clearly developed in the segregation cases culmi-
nating in an unequivocal statement in Brown v. Board of Education in
1954; and since then the right has been recognized and reaffirmed on
numerous occasions including an approving quotation from Brown in
Rodriguez.97 The right is more likely to be vindicated when it is asserted
in negative, procedural, opportunity-oriented terms than when it is as-
serted in positive, substantive, results-oriented terms. Arguments as to fi-
nancial cost and administrative efficacy have not proven effective to
92. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 33-34. This proposition was vigorously disputed by Justice Marshall
in a lengthy dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall detailed several rights regarded
by theCourt as "fundamental" but which cannot meet the "explicit-implicit" test
adopted by the majority in the present case. Id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 35.
95. Id. at 36.
96. ld. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 29-30.
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sustain school practices in derogation of this right. Whether the right is a
"fundamental" one capable of invoking the compelling state interest
standard of review is not clear at this time.98
2. Federally Protected Rights from Non-Constitutional Sources
Pertinent educational rights may arise from two federal acts, section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197399 and the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975.100 The acts are identical in defining "handi-
capped children" and in requiring a "free appropriate public education"
for all such children between the ages of three and eighteen at present
and between the ages of three and twenty-one after September 1, 1980. The
main difference between the acts is that the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act is simply a granting formula-states complying with its stand-
ards are eligible for federal funds-whereas section 504 is a mandatory civil
rights law applicable to any program receiving funds in excess of $2,500,
regardless of the purposes for which the funds are received.10 1
Section 504 has been held to create affirmative rights capable of
supporting a private right of action. 102 Previous section 504 actions in the
education area have not been successful because of application by the
courts of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies doctrines.108
These cases involved students with pre-existing handicaps (deafness and
emotional disturbance), not handicaps created by school practices such as
social promotion. When the question is not how best to deal with a pre-
98. It is possible to formulate an argument for the existence of a positive,
substantive right to education. The argument rests on the fact that each state
now makes education compulsory for a certain number of years. When a state
subjects an individual to "confinement" to a school classroom for six hours a
day, nine months a year, for ten years, the state, in abridging the individual's
physical liberty, thereby assumes a duty to educate the individual. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held in two cases that involuntary confinement in
a state mental institution creates a constitutional right to medical treatment. The
state must either treat or release the patient. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F. 2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Since the degree of "confinement" in
public schools is substantially less than that in mental institutions, the argument
for a right to education is weaker than that for a right to medical treatment.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Section 504 bars discrimination against handi-
capped persons in three major areas: employment, architectural barriers, and
education.
100. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1419 (1976). See Comment, Legal Remedies for the
Misclassification or Wrongful Placement of Educationally Handicapped Children,
14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROD. 389 (1979).
101. For a useful comparison of the two acts, see Erb Sc Mercer, Legislationfor the Handicapped: in Brief, 7 NOLPE ScH. L.J. 194 (1977).
102. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). Accord,
United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977). See generally
Salomone, Enforcing Educational Rights Through Private Actions: One Step
Beyond Batke, 8 NOLPE ScH. L.J. 76 (1978).
103. Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Crawford v.
University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
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existing handicap, but rather how to redress a wrong caused by the educa-
tional system itself, the defenses of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
remedies lose much of their force. The reason for this is that while statutes
give educational agencies primary responsibility for treating the educational
problems of the handicapped, the courts traditionally have had primary
responsibility for remedying the wrongs caused by tortious conduct.
Whether money damages are available on a direct action under sec-
tion 504 is not clear. Since money damages are clearly allowable under
section 1983, it might be best for an educationally injured student to
bring his action under section 1983 alleging the deprivation of a right pro-
tected by section 504.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act does not itself
create any federally protected rights on which a section 1983 action could
be based. The Act, however, operates as an inducement for states to create
rights which, in turn, are protected by the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution. Such rights could then support a section 1983 action. The
pertinent Missouri statutes read as follows:
In order to fully implement section 1 (a) of article IX, con-
stitution of Missouri, 1945, providing for the establishment and
maintenance of free public schools for gratuitous instruction of
all persons in this State within ages not in excess of twenty-one
years as prescribed by law, it is hereby declared the policy of the
state of Missouri to provide or to require public schools to pro-
vide to all handicapped and severely handicapped children within
the ages prescribed herein, as an integral part of Missouri's sys-
tem of gratuitous education, special educational services sufficient
to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of handicapped
and severely handicapped children .... 104
Handicapped children, children under the age of twenty-one years
who have not completed an approved high school program and
who, because of mental, physical, emotional or learning problems,
require special educational services in order to develop to their
maximum capacity.105
The Missouri definition of "handicapped children" is broader than the
federal definition which provides:
The term "handicapped children" means mentally retarded,
hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped,
seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other
health impaired children, or children with specific learning dis-
abilities, who by reason thereof require special educational and
related services. 106
In Missouri, children with "learning problems" qualify on the face of the
statute as handicapped children, assuming they are under twenty-one years
104. RSMo § 162.670 (1978).
105. RSMo § 162.675 (2) (1978) (emphasis added).
106. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1) (1976).
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of age and have not yet completed high school. The federal statute, reach-
ing no further than "specific learning disabilities," appears narrower.
Furthermore, handicapped children in Missouri are entitled to "special
educational services in order to develop to their maximum capacity." The
federal requirement does not specify an entitlement to "maximal" develop-
ment of capacities.
The scope of the Missouri entitlement was discussed in Pitts v. Board
of Educationlo7 where the Kansas City Court of Appeals said in dictum
that a handicapped student was entitled to special education services in
order to reach "optimal personal development" even if such development
exceeded the average level for all students. 108 The case involved a student
who suffered from "organicity-a minimum brain dysfunction-manifested
by hyperactivity."'109 The student's IQ scores were above average and his
school performance was superior in reading but inferior in math and
spelling. His parents sought to have him designated a "handicapped child,"
and given special education services. The school board refused, and after
exhausting administrative review, the parents sought judicial review. Two
years after the case was filed the circuit court dismissed the petition as
moot on the ground that by the time any new evaluation could be had
the student would have graduated from high school. The appellate court
affirmed on the basis of mootness but said it was "disconcerted" with the
"laggardly" process of determination and added:
The decision of the Board to deny student Pitts evaluation as a
handicapped child rests on an error of law .... The Act does not
consign a student to an hypothetical median level of achievement
but allows optimal personal development where the actual ca-
pacity exceeds the average .... The determinations of the Board
that, in effect, the achievement of average scholastic performance
disqualifies for the remedial services of the Act are contrary to
law." 0
Under this view, once a handicap is established, the extent of the educa-
tional entitlement in Missouri is very broad. If such an entitlement quali-
fies as a protectible property interest under the due process clause, depriva-
tion of the entitlement could support a section 1983 claim. In Goss v.
Lopez"" the United States Supreme Court held that a student's statutory
entitlement to a public education is a property interest protected by the
due process clause." 2 Missouri's special education statute expressly makes
the provision of special education services to handicapped persons "an
integral part of Missouri's system of gratuitous education";113 hence, the
107. 568 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App., D.K.G. 1978).
108. Id. at 597.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
112. Id. at 574.
113. RSMo § 162.670 (1978).
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extension of the Goss ruling to special education entitlements would not
be a very great leap.
More difficult than finding a protectible property interest once handi-
capped -status has been established may be the initial establishment of
such status with respect to a victim of social promotion. The question is
whether, for example, an eighth grader with a second grade reading level
is a "handicapped child" within the meaning of the statute. The statute
defines a "handicapped child" as a child under age twenty-one who has
not completed high school and who "because of mental, physical, emotional
or learning problems" requires special educational services.'1 4 It is argu-
able that an eighth grade student with a second grade reading level
would experience "learning problems" and possibly "emotional prob-
lems" as well, and that, absent special educational services, he could not
participate effectively in the class. Such a student would not be far re-
moved from those in Lau v. Nichols"lu whose lack of basic English skills
rendered their "classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no
way meaningful.""16 It would be difficult, logically, to deny handicapped
status to a student whose lack of basic skills substantially diminished his
capacity to benefit from his classroom experiences.
. Finally, it may not be necessary to assert a handicapped status in
order to establish a federal claim. The Missouri Constitution states:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential
to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people,
the general assembly shall establish and maintain free public
schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state
within ages not in excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by
law.17
State statutes and regulations implement this command. The State of Mis-
souri has undertaken to provide an opportunity of an education, an op-
portunity which, once provided, becomes a constitutional right that, ac-
cording to Brown, "must be made available to all on equal terms."" 8
B. Justiciability
In Baker v. Carr"9 the United States Supreme Court said the test
for justiciability is: "[W]hether the duty asserted can be judicially identi-
fied and its breach judicially determined and whether protection for the
right asserted can be judicially molded."'120 If the duty, breach, and
remedy in a given case are not amenable to judicially manageable
114. RSMo § 162.675 (2) (1978).
115. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
116. Id. at 566.
117. Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 1 (a).
118. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 493.
119. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
120. Id. at 198.
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standards of review, courts are reluctant to act. This reluctance was illu-
strated recently in Board of Curators v. Horowitz.1 2 1
In Horowitz the Supreme Court held that the academic dismissal
of a medical student was "careful and deliberate"'1 2 and comported with
the requirements of procedural due process. For purposes of the present
analysis, the question is whether automatic or social promotion is a "care-
ful and deliberate" procedure or practice. If it is not, then presumably it
would not meet the requirements of procedural due process. In a social
promotion case, however, the question would remain as to whether the
wrongful placement of the student in a grade above his competency is
comparable to the outright dismissal or exclusion of a student as in Horo-
witz. This raises a substantive due process question with respect to the
fairness of the result reached in the proceedings in question.
Expressing the view that "[c]ourts are particularly ill-equipped to
evaluate academic performance,"' 123 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court in Horowitz, was reluctant to review the substantive due process
claim. While agreeing with the district court that no showing of arbitrari-
ness or capriciousness had been made,' 24 he refused to embrace an "arbi-
trary or capricious" standard of review with respect to academic dismis-
sals from public schools. The reasons given for declining to "enlarge the
judicial presence in the academic community" included the fear that such
an enlargement would harm the "many beneficial aspects of the faculty-
student relationship," and the reluctance of the Court to encroach upon
the expertise of professional educators in evaluating their students. 125
The Missouri Supreme Court has also been reluctant to review the
substantive performance of academic functions. Smith v. Consolidated
School District No. 2126 involved the propriety of including wrestling in
a high school curriculum. In declining to resolve this question, the court
said: "The courts will not interfere with the exercise of a school dis-
trict's discretion except in a case of clear abuse, fraud, or some similar
conduct."127
These cases manifest a strong judicial doubt as to the availability of
manageable standards for reviewing the substantive content of academic
functions. In other cases, however, the courts have set such doubts aside
and plunged into the thicket.
The segregation cases following Plessy v. Ferguson 28 and culminating
in Brown required in several instances judicial examination of academic
offerings to determine whether the separate educational opportunities
121. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
122. Id. at 85.
123. Id. at 92.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 89-90.
126. 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. En Banc 1966).
127. Id. at 53.
128. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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were really equal.129 In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,13 a Negro
admitted to a doctoral program at the University of Oklahoma was re-
quired to sit apart from other students in the classrooms, in the library,
and in the cafeteria. The Court said: "The result is that appellant is
handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such restric-
tions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profes-
sion.'131
The Court again evaluated relative academic opportunities in Sweatt
v. Painter 32 where a Negro had been refused admission to the University
of Texas Law School but was offered admission to a newly established
law school for Negroes. In concluding that the new school did not repre-
sent an equal educational opportunity, the Court examined both objec-
tive factors such as number of faculty members, course variety, and library
size, and qualities incapable of objective measurement such as the repu-
tation of the faculty and experience of the administration.
In Hobson v. Hansen133 the educational opportunities open to Negro
and disadvantaged students who were unfairly placed in a lower educa-
tional track were examined in great detail and found wanting. In Lau v.
Nichols'3 4 and Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools' 35 the courts felt they
were competent to declare the educational opportunities afforded students
lacking basic English skills to be legally inadequate.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder-36 the question was whether the alternative
education provided by Amish citizens for their children was adequate to
satisfy the state's interests in universal education. After considering expert
testimony presented at the trial level, the Supreme Court concluded that
"[the Amish] have carried the even more difficult burden of demonstrat-
ing the adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal voca-
tional education in terms of precisely those overall interests the State ad-
vances in support of its program of compulsory high school education." 137
The preceding cases indicate that when a serious question as to the
equality of an educational opportunity is presented, the courts will ex-
amine the merits of the issues. Such issues are in fact justiciable. A sec-
tion 1983 claim that an educational practice such as social promotion has
deprived a student of his constitutional right to an equal educational op-
portunity would probably not fail for want of justiciability; although, this
129. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
130. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
131. Id. at 641.
132. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
133. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
134. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
135. 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), afrd, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
136. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
137. Id. at 235.
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conclusion must be tempered by the repeated expressions in Horowitz of
judicial reluctance to review substantive academic issues. 138
C. The Eleventh Amendment
On its face the eleventh amendment bars suits in federal courts against
a state by citizens of another state. The Supreme Court has held that this
prohibition extends to suits by a state's own citizens as well. 1 39 This, then,
raises the question whether a public school district can be sued at all under
section 1983.140
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle141 in-
volved a section 1983 action by a school teacher who had been fired. The
Supreme Court held that the school board had no eleventh amendment im
munity. "The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts
extends to States and state officials in appropriate circumstances .... but
does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations."'142 The
Court reasoned that a "state" does not, within the meaning of the
eleventh amendment, include political subdivisions; that school districts
were political subdivisions; and therefore, that school districts were not
immunized against suit. In Missouri, school districts are declared by statute
to be political subdivisions,' 43 and hence should not be entitled to an
eleventh amendment immunity.
A different question is whether school districts are amenable to suit
as "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. The answer was given in
Monell v. Department of Social Services'" where the Supreme Court held:
"Local governing bodies .. .can be sued directly under § 1983 for mone-
tary, declaratory, or injuctive relief."'14 5 Dicta in the opinion make it clear
that "local governing bodies" includes school boards.' 46 The Court added,
however, that local governing bodies could not, under section 1983, be
held vicariously liable on a theory of respondeat superior.147 Nonethe-
less, "local governments, like every other 1983 'person,' by the very terms of
the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant
to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received
138. See Pavela, Judicial Review of Academic Decisionmaking After "Horo-
witz," 8 NOLPE ScH. L.J. 55 (1978).
139. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
140. In Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978), a § 1983 suit by prison inmates
against the Alabama Board of Corrections was held barred by the eleventh
amendment.
141. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
142. Id. at 280.
143. RSMo § 70.210 (2) (1978).
144. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
145. Id. at 690.
146. Id. at 696-99.
147. Id. at 691. For a thorough analysis of this aspect of the Monell decision,
see Comment, Respondeat Superior Liability of Municipalities for Constitutional
Torts After "MoneU": New Remedies to Pursue?, 44 Mo. L. REv. 514 (1979).
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formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels."' 48
In this context it is not difficult to argue that social promotion is an
acknowledged custom of public schools today. 149
The above discussion indicates that neither the eleventh amendment
nor the limitations inherent in the language of section 1983 should pre-
clude the kind of social promotion case being analyzed here.
D. Mental States and Qualified Immunities
While simple negligence alone will not support a section 1983 ac-
tion,150 a finding of "deliberate indifference" has been held to be suf-
ficient.' 5' Furthermore, a pattern of related negligent acts may lead to a
finding of deliberate indifference: 52
Where plaintiffs have been able to demonstrate a pattern or
practice of improper behavior, knowledge of it has been imputed
to the responsible supervisory official so that the injury to the
individual no longer appears to be the result of purely negligent
conduct-for which the supervisor would not normally be liable-
but of the "deliberate indifference" of the supervisor who might
have, but did not, take action to prevent continued injuries.15 3
A question might be raised as to whether the imputation of a culpable
mental state to the supervisory official or agency runs afoul of Monell's
strictures against recovery on a respondeat superior theory. The focus
in Monell was on the "causation" requirement of section 1983: "[A]ny
person who ... shall subject or cause to be subjected, any person .. . to
the deprivation of any rights . . . ." The conclusion was that "Congress
did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was ab-
sent."' 54 A finding that but for "deliberate indifference" on the part of
the supervisory official or agency the injury would not have occurred would
148. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
149. As one writer put it: "As recently as last year an educator of national
prominence suggested that social promotion was a practice so well entrenched in
public schools that only a revolution could erase it." Thompson, Because Schools
are Burying Social Promotion, Kids Must Perform to Pass, 166 Am. ScH. BD. J.
30, 30 (Jan. 1979). The very next sentence in the above quotation was, "But he
was wrong." This burst of optimism referred to the author's study of five specific
school systems and to public opinion polls showing people do not like social
promotion. The author subsequently hedged by saying, "All of these rumblings
may not add up to a full scale revolution in public education, but they do portend
significant changes." Id. See also Hogan, "Obtaining an Education" as a Right of
the People, 3 NOLPE ScH. L.J. 15 (1973). Note, The Right to Education: A Con-
stitutional Analysis, 44 U. GIN. L. REv. 796 (1975).
150. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d
541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974). See Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federal-
ism, 90 H~Auv. L. Rav. 1133, 1205 (1977).
151. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d
1224 (2d Cir. 1974); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 54344 (2d Cir. 1974).
152. Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1226 (2d Cir. 1974).
153. Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 150,
at 1207.
154. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
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appear to meet the Monell requirement. 155 Thus, deliberate indifference
by school officials to the educational injuries caused by a custom of social
promotion could be a sufficient mental state for liability under section 1983.
In Pierson v. Ray'5 0 the Supreme Court held that section 1983 was
not meant to abolish common law immunities for government officials
and that police officers retain, with respect to section 1983 damage actions,
a qualified immunity. School officials were provided a similar qualified
immunity in Wood v. Strickland.'5 7 There is no monetary liability for a
school official acting "in good faith in the course of exercising his dis-
cretion within the scope of his official duties." 5 8 However, an act done
in "ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law" is not an act done
in good faith, 5 0 and may even rise to the level of malice, at which point
punitive damages might be available. 160
Would the qualified immunity of school officials be a defense to a
section 1983 claim that a student's constitutional right to an equal edu-
cational opportunity was violated by the practice of social promotion?
The answer under Wood would depend on whether or not the act of social
promotion was done in ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law.
Clearly the law is settled and well known to professional educators that
there is a constitutional right to an equal educational opportunity,' 6 ' but
is this all that is required? Probably not. Procunier v. Navarette162 ex-
panded the Wood "disregard of settled law" limitation on the immunity
defense by saying:
155. Causation has also been found where supervisory officials breached a
statutory duty to control the conduct of subordinates for the plaintiff's benefit.
See Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976) (action against mayor and
police chief for breach of duty to control policeman's known propensity for im-
proper use of force). Such a theory of causation may be relevant to a claim that
school officials breached a statutory duty to see that teachers provided special




386 U.S. 547 (1967).
157. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
158. Id. at 319.
159. Id. at 321.
160. This was the dissent's interpretation of the Court's holding. Id. at 327-
31. With respect to the general availability of punitive damages in § 1983 actions,
see Batista v. Weir, 840 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Palmer v. Hall, 517 F.2d 705
(5th Cir. 1975). Both cases held punitive damages were available when malice
was shown.
161. The right was established in 1954 in Brown and has been repeatedly af-
firmed. See cases cited notes 84-89 supra. That the right is well known to pro-
fessional educators is reflected by the discussions of the right in educationaljournals. See, e.g., Hogan, "Obtaining an Education" as a Right of the People, 3
NOLPE SCH. L.J. 15 (1973).
162. 434 U.S. 555 (1978). In this case a § 1983 damage action against prison
officials alleging interference with a prisoner's outgoing mail failed because the
prison officials possessed a qualified immunity and, at the time of the conduct
complained of, there was no established first amendment right protecting the mail-
ing privileges of state prison inmates.
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[T]he immunity defense would be unavailing.., if the constitu-
tional right allegedly infringed... was clearly established at the
time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or should have
known of that right and if they knew or should have known that
their conduct violated the constitutional norm. 163
Apparently, then, the question of whether professional educators knew or
should have known that a practice of social promotion violated the con-
stitutional right of the students to an equal educational opportunity would
be a question for the jury. An affirmative answer would defeat the im-
munity defense.
E. Damages
In Carey v. Piphus'64 the Court said Congress intended generally to
allow only for compensatory damages under section 1983, although puni-
tive damages might properly be awarded in a case where malice was proved
and a deterrent purpose could be served by such an award. 16 In Carey
a denial of procedural due process occurred with respect to a child's sus-
pension from school for misconduct. No actual injury was shown, how-
ever, and damages were limited to a nominal award of one dollar. Mental
and emotional distress would have been compensable injuries had they
been proven.166
In Peter W. damages of $500,000 were pleaded; the plaintiff in Dono-
hue alleged damages of $5,000,000.167 In Hoffman' 68 a jury awarded
$750,000 in damages, subsequently reduced to $500,000 on a remittitur. In
an educational injury case compensatory damages may comprise both tan-
gible and intangible damages. The cost of tutorial services needed to redress
the injury may involve tutoring the student up to grade level not only in
basic skills such as reading, but also in the substantive knowledge he has
been deprived of by being in upper level classes where course materials
were above his competency level. Other damages might include the value
of lost earnings while the student attends the necessary remedial classes
and damages for any irremediable harm to the student's intellectual de-
velopment.1 69
Section 1983 damage actions have often been unsuccessful.1 7 0 One
reason has been the qualified immunity available to executive officials.
Another reason has been that section 1983 plaintiffs often have not been
sympathetic characters, e.g., prison inmates and criminal defendants;
whereas the typical section 1983 defendant has been a lower level
163. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
164. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
165. Id. at 255-57.
166. Id. at 264.
167. Elson, supra note 23, at 761 n.464.
168. Hoffnan v. Board of Educ., 64 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
169. For an excellent discussion of the question of damages, see Elson, supra
note 23, at 754-62.
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government official who could ill-afford a heavy damage judgment. 17 1
Finally, a major reason has been the difficulty of measuring the damages.
For example, it is difficult to place a monetary value on a given
plaintiff's exercise of first amendment rights or his right to vote
or to attend an integrated public school, or on his dignitary and
symbolic interest in not being subjected to false imprisonment,
invasion of privacy, or stigmatization. 172
It is now well recognized, however, that "[d]ifficulty of ascertainment is
no longer confused with the right of recovery for a proven invasion of the
plaintiff's rights."'173 The Supreme Court has also recognized that it simply
is not fair to bar recovery because the damages are difficult to measure:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascer-
tainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be
a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all re-
lief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from
making any amend for his acts.Y74
It is worth observing that difficulties of measurement have not been a
bar to awarding damages for intangibles such as past and future pain and
suffering and for mental and emotional distress. The fixing of an ap-
propriate damage award for "diminished intellectual development"'175 and
other educational injuries should be no more difficult.
IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis indicates that an educational injury resulting
from the deprivation of a student's constitutional right to an equal edu-
cational opportunity may prove to be a compensable wrong. In states
where sovereign immunity has been abolished, a recovery for such an
injury may be sought on a theory of educational malpractice. In all states,
an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 appears to be viable.
MILTON B. 'GARBER
171. Id. at 1225.
172. Id. at 1226.
173. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946).
174. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
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